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THE THREE KINGDOMS AND WESTERN JIN: 
A HISTORY OF CHINA IN THE THIRD CENTURY AD - II 
� Rafe de Crespigny 
3. 1HE EMPIRE OF WESTERN JIN (265-317)" 
The Unification of China (265-280) 
When Sima Yan aj ,\'!1� received the atxiication of Cao Huan If � and 
proclaimed his own empire ofJin If, the formal ceremony was no more than 
the culmination of a process by which his family had seized control of the 
affairs of the state of Wei ll..t Sirna Yan's accession followed closely upon 
the triumphant conquest of Shu-Han Jilrl, 2 while the court of Wu � was in 
turmoil and faced rebellion in the far south. 3 With apparently overwhelming 
strength, and the energy of a new regime, there was reason to expect that 
the power of Jin would be swiftly turned against the south of the Yangzi and 
the unification of the Chinese world would soon be completed. In fact, 
however, Sirna Yan and his advisers were uncertain of their position, and 
they were reluctant to embark upon another great campaign. 
The poliCies and structure of Jin reflected the origins of the Sima family 
power and the convictions with which they had seized it. The Sima had 
obtained support because they were seen as the representatives of the great 
clans against the Cao family, and it is fair to assume that they believed their 
position was correct and honourable. Though the political opponents of the 
imperial govemment ofWei had pursued their own interests, they identified 
those interests with a true morality, and they regarded themselves as men of 
traditional 'Confucian' virtue, contending with an authoritarian centralism 
identified with 'Legalist' principles. In this respect one may discern a renewal 
of the debate, identified by Loewe for the Han period, between 'Refomllst' 
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This work has been prepared as a chapter for 
the second volume of The Cambridge his­
toryo! China. I present it here in preliminary 
form because I believe there is room for a 
general survey of the third century, which 
saw the transition from a long-unified em­
pire to a comparable period of disunity and 
conflict, and because I know that I shall 
benefit from the comments and criticisms of 
others. I emphasize that the piece is de­
signed as a discussion of events. I refer 
occasionally to matters of literature and 
philosophy, but there are other scholars 
expert in those fields, and I have sought 
only to proVide a historical background to 
their analysis. 
The work appears in two sections: the 
first, "The Three Kingdoms and WesternJin, 
I" [3K&Wj Il, which appeared in East Al'ian 
History 1, dealt with the foundations of the 
Three Kingdoms and the rival empires. This 
second section is concerned with Western 
Jin. In preparing it, I have been greatly assis­
ted by my colleague Dr K.H.j. Gardiner, and 
I am extremely grateful for the advice and 
guidance he has given me. 
1 44 
• The st andard Chinese histoIY of this pe­
riod is Jin shu :U. (jS), 130 chapters 
(Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1974), which was 
compiled, on the basis of a number of earlier 
works, by a committee of scholars headed 
byFangXuanling m� .. ( S78-648) under 
the auspices of the Tang Emperor Taizong 
.Qf::t*. The work includes imperial an­
nals, treatises, individual biographies, and 
parallel annals (zaiji tUG) of rival non­
Chinese st ates. On the historiography of JS, 
see "Notes on the economic histoIY of the 
Chin dynasty," i n  Yang Lien-sheng, Studies 
in Chinese institutional h�fory(Cambri dge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1%3), 
pp.ll9-97 [first published in Haroard Jour­
nal oj Asiatic Studies 9 (1952), pp.l07-SS] 
at 119-23, and K.H.J. Gardiner, "Standard 
histories, Han to Sui ," in Essays on the 
sourcesJor Chinese h �tory, ed. Donald D. 
Leslie, Colin Mackerras, and Wang Gungwu 
(Canberra: Australian National University 
Press, 1973), pp.42-S2, at 45-6. 
Information on earlier hist0IY is found in 
the Sanguo zhi (SGZ) of Chen Shou (233-
297), with commentaIY (PC) compiled by 
Pei Songzhi (396-446). Chapters 79-89 of 
the Zizhi tongjian (ZZ1]) of Sirna Guang 
(1019-&» (Bei jing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1956) 
present the histoIY of the WesternJin period 
in chronicle form. Unfortunately, however, 
there is no substantial translation of this part 
of ZZ7J, nor of its source texts. 
1 The biography and annals of Sima Yan 
(236-290), posthumously honoure d as Em­
peror Wu lEt of Jin, are in ]S2. The annals! 
biography of Cao Huan, last ruler of Wei, are 
in SGZ 4!Wei 4. The abdication i s  discussed 
in 3K&WJ I, p.3S. 
2 The conquest of Shu-Han is discussed in 
3K&WJ I, p.23. 
3 On the intrigues which surrounded the 
accession of Sun Hao f,\1I2i to the throne of 
Wu in 264, see 3K&WJ I, p.l7. On the 
rebellion in the region of present-day Viet­
nam, which broke out in 263 and was put 
down in 271, see, for example, SGZ 48/Wu 
3, 1161 and 1168. 
4 See Michael Loewe, Crisis and conflict in 
Han China (London: Allen & Unwin, 1974), 
pp.ll-13, and "The Former Han dynasty," in 
The Cambridge h �tory oj China, vol. 1: The 
Ch 'in and Han Empires 221BC-AD 220 [CC 
1], ed. Denis Twitchett and Michael Loewe 
(Cambri dge: Cambri dge Universi ty Press, 
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'Mcxiemist' approaches to imperial government,4 and the policies of the 
Sima reflected a real concern for a structure of government and society 
which would give proper respect to men of quality. 
So the Sima, unlike their imperial predecessors the Iiu ,� of Han and 
the Cao of Wei, were committed to a position as chief amongst other noble 
clans, and by both politics and philosophy they were reluctant to claim the 
full authority of the imperial throne. 
On the other hand, it was still necessary to run a government, and 
Sima Yi iiJ,�ro, Sima Shi iiJ�Mi, Sima Zhao iiJ,�pg,5 and Sima Yan had, 
each in tum, shown a capacity for firm action. Moreover, in contrast to 
the policies of Han and Wei, since the rulers of Jin regarded the state as 
an extension of their family, they had no hesitation in relying upon their 
brothers and cousins. The day after he took the imperial title, Sima Yan 
enfeoffed twenty-seven of his relatives as princes,6 and these princes 
were maintairled in positions of power. Two of the eight senior mirlisters 
were members of the imperial clan, several princes served as Area 
Commanders and provincial Inspectors, with substantial local authority,7 
and all were given responsibility for the administration of their fiefs.8 The 
Wei dynasty had fallen into alien hands because its emperors lacked the 
support of their own relatives, but the Sima had gained their pOSition 
through appointments granted within the family, and the Jin dynasty 
would not be so defenceless. 
At the same time, however, if the Sima were prepared to rely so heavily 
upon relationship and personal loyalty, it was difficult for the emperor to 
enforce the authority which had been claimed by earlier rulers . The Han 
dynasty, moreover, had developed its legitimacy over centuries, and the 
Wei had acquired their power through conquest, but although Sima Yi and 
his relatives had played a notable role in the military affairs of the state, their 
mairl route to the throne had been through political intrigue and coups 
d'etat. As a result, the power of the Jin government was restricted, and for 
some years there remained a sense of uncertairlty regardirlg its competence 
and its right to rule. 
Sima Yan evidently felt he could not afford to risk an immediate attack 
on Wu, for the consequences of a setback or defeat could have been 
disastrous for his prestige and even for his new regime. Though Jin now 
controlled the Sichuan basin, the years of bitter conflict agairlst Shu-Han, 
and the hostility that remained among the defeated enemy, meant the 
resources of that region could hardly be mobilized quickly, and the 
strategic defenses of Wu along the Yangzi appeared secure. 
There was trouble, moreover, with the non-Chirlese people of the 
frontier, particularly in the north-west between the Wei river and the Ordos. 
Years earlier, when the Wei general Deng Ai IDlX: was engaged in that 
region, he had forced the surrender of a group of Xianbi U!i1f. and brought 
them irlto the upper Wei.9 By the late 260s, however, under the leadership 
THE THREE KINGDOMS AND WESTERN JIN 
of the chieftainJifu Shujineng ��;DHI1m, these immigrants were causing 
trouble. A new province, Qin _, was established with a special command 
in 269, but in the following year a local Chinese army was destroyed, and 
another shared its fate in 271 . In response to this sign of weakness the 
Xiongnu �� leader Liu Meng ;�  rebelled and raided the territory 
further north, and although he was killed in 272 the unrest continued. 
Eventually, in 279, whenJifu Shujineng was killed in battle, the remainder 
of the Xianbi surrendered and the region was restored once again to some 
form of control. 10 
By this time, the sta te of] in was sufficiently well esta blished for a serious 
attack against the south. There had been no substantial breakthrough on 
the line of the Yangzi, but the government of Wu was consistently on the 
defensive, and Sun Hao was losing both support and confidence. There 
was still uncertainty among the advisers of Sima Yan, but the forward policy 
had long been advocated by the senior general Yang Hu t;ts, commander 
on the Han River, and the project was taken up by his successor Du Yu lim 
and the minister Zhang Hua �¥. 11 
The essence of the plan was to outflank the position of Wu by an 
invasion from Sichuan. While Sima Zhou commanded a direct attack 
southwards,12 Wang Jun Iw, Inspector of Yi � province, prepared a 
great fleet and sailed through the Yangzi Gorges, breaking the river barriers 
and opening the way for the regular troops ofJin to advance down the Han 
and across the Huai.13 The campaign began in the spring of 280, and by 
the third month the combined forces of the invaders were at the walls of 
Jianye � •. On 1 May 280, deserted by his last troops, Sun Hao came to 
the camp ofWangJun and handed over his seals and insignia to Sima Zhou. 
Figure 1 
Preparing the ground with a harrow: painting on brick 
from a third-century tomb at Jiayuguan, north-west China 
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/1986), pp.103-222 at 104-5, also "The struc­
ture and practice of government: CC I, 
pp.463-90 at.488-9. 
5 The biography of Sima Yi (retrospectively 
entitled Emperor Xuan 1t of Jin) is in jS 1 ,  
and that of his eldest son Sima Shi (Emperor 
Jing :li!I:) is infi2. The biography of Sima Zhao 
(Emperor Wen )(), brother of Sima Shi and 
falher ofSima Yan, is infi2. The rise of the Si­
ma family is discussed in 3K&WJ I, pp.32-5. 
6 jS 3, 52; ZZTJ79, 2492-3; Achilles Fang, 
The Chronicle of the Three Kingdoms, 2 vols 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1952 and 1 %5) [Fang, Chronicle, 1 , 21 2: 5<Xi, 
516. The term 'prince' here renders the 
Chinese wang ::E, indicating the highest 
rank of a subordinate nobility. Unlike Han 
and Wei, which established kings/princes 
(wang), marquises (hou tV, and then sev­
eral lower orders of nobility, Jin introduced 
a five-rank system based upon the system 
attributed to the ancient Zhou dynasty: the 
change may be interpreted as another sign 
of their intention to return to the virtues of 
the ancients, before the centuries of impe­
rial authority. 
7 On Area Commanders and other regional 
military posts, see p.l52 below. For mem­
bers of the Sima clan holding senior local 
and military positions, see, for example, 
Wan Sitong, comp., Wei fangzhen nianbiao , 
in Ershiwu shi hubian [ESWSBB), 2 vols 
(Shanghai, KaimingShudian, 1930-37/1957), 
2: 2617-23, and the two compilations en­
titledjin fangzhen nianbiao by Wan Sitong, 
in ESWSBB 3: 338>--97, and by Wu Tingxie 
in ibid. ,  pp.341>--51 . 
Sima Zhou i:iJ,�f!ll (227-283), for ex­
ample, son of Sima Yi and half-uncle of the 
new emperor, had been appointed General 
and Inspector supervising all military affairs 
in Yan 3t province in 263; in 266 he was 
enfeoffed as a prince, but continued in 
office, and was later transferred to other 
senior military and administrative positions 
(see his biography injS38, at 1121,  and n.ll 
below). Sima Liang ifij,!!13t (d.291), brother 
of Sima Zhou, was Area Commander-in­
Chief of Yong Ji and Liang iij{ provinces 
in the north-west. He too was enfeoffed in 
266, but remained in office and went on to 
occupy further high positions of state (see 
his biography in jS 59, at 1 591). 
1 46 
8 jS38, 1 121 ; ZZ1] 79, 2493; Fang, Chronicle 
2, pp.506--7. 
9 The biography ofDeng Ai (c.200-264) is in 
SGZ28IWei 28. On the disturbances among 
these non-Chinese people in the 270s, see jS 
3, 58, and ZZ1] 79, 2509. 
10 jS 3, 70, and ZZ1] 80, 2554 and 2559. 
11 The biographies of Yang Hu (221-278) 
and of Du Yu (222-284) are in jS 34. The 
biography of Zhang Hua (232-300) is in jS 
36; it is translated by Anna Straughair, Chang 
Hua: a statesman-poet of the Western Chin 
dynasty (Canberra: Australian National Uni­
versity, 1 973). 
12 The biography of Sima Zhou (227-283), 
younger brother of Sima Zhao, is in jS 38. 
See also n.7 a1::xlYe. 
13 The biography of WangJun (206--285) is 
in jS 42. The description at 1200-10 of his 
attack against Wu, which included a pon­
toon raft more than six hundred feet square 
acting as a floating fortress, is discussed and 
translated by Joseph Needham, Science and 
civilisation in China, vol.4, no.3 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp.694-
5. A general account of the campaign is in 
the annals of jS 3,70-1 , and in ZZ1], 80-1 , 
2558--67. Besides Wang Jun's force, five 
armies were involved in the attack from the 
north, the total number of soldiers involved 
being said to have been 200, 000. 
14 SGZ 4IWei 4, 153; Fang, Chronicle 2, 
p.468; andjS3, 55. The significance of these 
decrees is discussed by William Gordon 
Crowell, "Government land policies and 
systems in early imperial China" (PhD diss., 
Seattle: University of Washington, 1979), 
pp.165-8. 
15 There are references to agricultural garri­
sons and their separate military administra­
tion during the late 270s in jS 26, 787 and 
789; Yang, "Economic history," pp.173, 175. 
16 See, for example, Crowell, "Government 
land policies," p.181, n.82, quoting Guang 
Li'an, Yuan Shixing, Tang Changru, and 
Zhang Weihua. 
17 jS24, 731 , the 'Treatise of Officials', says 
that there was a Bureau for Agricultural 
Garrisons il!.EEflii among the six estab­
lished within the Secretariat �. at the 
beginning of J in, and this office was presum­
ably responsible for some overall supervi­
sion of the garrisons throughout the empire. 
After the conquest of Wu in 280, the name 
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Settlement o/the Empire (280-290) 
In 264, at the time of the conquest of Shu-Han, a decree of the government 
of Wei under the control of Sima Zhao abolished the separate administration 
of government agricultural garrisons (tuntian rt!. 8V "in order to equalize the 
cOrvc'�e services." The officials in charge were transferred to the regular 
hierarchy of commanderies and counties, and the court of Jin confirmed the 
policy two years later. 14 
This pair of edicts did not eliminate all agricultural garrisons,15 but it did 
represent a reduction in central control over those substantial assets of labour 
and land, and the change reflects a weakening of the govemment's position 
against the powerful families to whom the Sima owed their accession to the 
throne. There is considerable debate on the manner in which the nature and 
the function of the garrisons had been subverted, whether by the encroach­
ment of local gentry and officials who took the people and the land under 
their own control, or by the excessive demands made upon the colonists by 
competing local and central interests,16 but there is no doubt that the 
centralising policies of the early state of Wei, expressed particularly through 
government access to the special resources of the garrisons, were now 
largely abandoned. Because of their contribution to military operations, the 
ganisons were maintained in form during the next few years, but they played 
only a limited role in the future economy of the state. After the conquest of 
Wu, when the major need for military expenditure and energy had passed, 
the system of agricultural garrisons was subsumed into the general land 
system of the empireY 
As on other occasions in Chinese history, the reunification of the empire 
left the victorious government with serious problems of disarmament and 
reconstruction. The situation had not been so urgent at the time of the 
conquest of Shu-Han, for there still remained the rival and powerful state of 
Wu, and surplus troops could be transferred to serve on that front. In 280, 
however, apart from the general defense of the north, there was no need for 
more than local ganisons, and there remained a great number of soldiers and 
their families, many of them maintained in service for generations, who 
should now be settled into productive work. There was room for resettle­
ment along the old frontier with Wu, between the Huai River and the Yangzi 
and on the lower reaches of the Han, there were other regions which had 
not been fully occupied or exploited in the years of war, and abolition of the 
agricultural garrisons allowed a reassessment of their land. 
In these cirumstances, the government of Jin established a system of land 
allocation (ketian �EB), based upon the entitlement of each individual in 
the farming community. The basic unit was fifty mou iB�, 18 which was the 
amount allocated to a 'regular' male, aged between sixteen and sixty years. 
A 'secondary' male, aged between thirteen and fifteen or sixty-one and sixty­
five, received half that amount, and a regular female received twenty mou. 
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Figure 2 
Ox-cart: painting on brickfrom a third-century tomb 
at jiayuguan, north-west China 
Those older or younger received no allocation. 19 Though it is unlikely the 
system could have been maintained for long, it served as the formal basis for 
the resettlement and reconstruction of the countryside in the years after the 
unification of the empire. 
As a corollary to the allocation of land, and reflecting a policy established 
by Cao Cao "tt, founder of Wei, taxes were levied on each household: one 
which was headed by a regular male was required to pay three pi [!; of silk 
and three jin IT of silk floss, while one which was headed by a female or 
secondary male paid half that amount. 20 In this regard, an allocation of tax 
against each household was markedly easier to administer than the Han 
system based upon land or a poll-tax, for it did not require such a detailed 
survey or census; 21 and the assessment in kind reflects a continuing decline 
in the use of coinage. 
There had been currency and inflation problems throughout Later Han, 
but when the government of Dong Zhuo jiJi[ replaced the traditional wushu 
1i.tf coinage with smaller units at the beginning of the civil war in the 190s, 
it brought a collapse of the money economy. Cao Cao and his son Cao Pi 
":3S:both attempted to restore the wushu coinage, but in 221 the government 
of Wei formally declared that grain and silk should be the official means of 
exchange. Though the wushu were later revived again, and were maintained 
in circulation by the government of Jin,22 the official economy still relied 
upon commodity exchange. 
One effect of the years of disturbance had been a decline in private 
commerce and a more limited pattern of trade than in the time of Han. The 
great landed estates, concerned primarily with their own self-sufficiency, 
concentrated their economic activity into small local areas, and numbers of 
people came to take service with them. In some cases, as we have seen, these 
147 
lof this bureau was changed to Bureau for 
Agriculture 't!.EE. 
18 Under Jin, the area of a mou was about 
one-fifth of an English acre, so fifty mou 
would have been eqUivalent to some ten 
acres or four hectares. 
19 The ketian system is described in jS 26, 
7CJJ, translated and discussed by Yang, "Eco­
nomic history," pp.l79 and 135-40, and by 
Crowell, "Government land policies," pp. 
199-203. I am impressed by, and accept, 
CroweU's argument that the expression ketian 
refers to an actual allocation of land rather 
than to the amount a person should cultivate 
or be taxed upon. 
20 jS 26, 7CJJ; Yang, "Economic history," 
p.l79. A piwas 4D chi R (feet), inJin times 
equivalent to some 9.5 metres or 10 1 /2 
yards by English measure. Ajin was about 
225 grams, or half a pound avoirdupois. 
Cao Cao appears to have collected tax in 
the form of silk from an early period of his 
government (e.g. SGZ 12/Wei 12,  380, and 
SGZ 23/Wei 23, 668), and he applied a 
household levy (hutiao fS � of silk to the 
region of north China formerly held by the 
Yuan :jji family after he had taken it over in 
the early years of the third century. Obvi­
ously, whether under Han, Wei or Jin, the 
actual commodity used for payment must 
have varied and been exchanged to meet 
official requirements. 
21 On the tax system of Han, see Nishijima 
Sadao, "The economic and social history of 
Former Han," CC 1, pp.595-601 . 
22 SGZ 2, 78, SGZ 3, 92, with jS 26, 782 and 
794-5; Yang, "Economic history," pp.l59, 
191-2. See also He Ziquan, "Early develop­
ment of manorial economy in Wei and Tsin" 
[originally published in full form as " Wei-Jin 
shiqi zhuangyuan jingji de chuxing," in 
Shihuo.1.1 (934): 6-1 OJ in E-tu Zen Sun and 
John DeFrancis, ChinesesociaJhistory, trans­
lations of selected studies (Washington D.C.: 
American Council ofl.earned Societies, 1956), 
pp.l37-41, at 140. 
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23 This process is well described by Yang 
Zhongyi, "Evolution of the status of depen­
dents" [originally published in full form as 
"Buqu yange luekao: Shihuo 1 .3 (1935): 
97-1071 in Sun and De Francis, Chinese 
social history, pp.l42-56, at 144-5. 
24 See the report from the official Shu Xi 
.lKt?1 to the minister Zhang Hua in the late 
2c,x)s: jS51 ,  1 431-2, cited by Crowell, "Gov­
ernment land policies: p.2OS. 
25 A similar change may be observed during 
the decline of the Roman empire. In Britain, 
for example, where the former pattern of 
economy had supported and encouraged 
Widespread trade through market-towns, 
the last period of Roman rule saw a contrac­
tion of commerce, a marked decline in the 
prosperity and population of towns and 
cities, and the development of the villa as a 
localized centre of economic activity. One 
notable reason for this was the vulnerability 
of the towns to the ravages of armed en­
emies and, equally important, the demands 
of government taxation. 
26 The zhantian regulations appear as one 
sentence in the passage of jS26, 7c,x); Yang, 
"Economic history: p.179. The text is dis­
cussed by Yang at pp.132-40, and by Crowell, 
"Government land policies," pp.192-9. It 
has been a source of considerable debate 
among scholars, but I accept the interpreta­
tion of Yang as amended by Crowell. 
27 The well-field (jingtian # 93) system is 
described in the Book of Mencius 3A.3, 
translated by James Legge, The Confucian 
classics, 5 vols (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press, 1960), 2: 243-5, and dis-
Figure 3 
Slaughtering a pig: painting on 
brick from a third-century tomb at 
Jiayuguan, north-west China 
(and consider the story told of Cao 
Cao in 190 AD: Sanguo y anyi 
[Romance of the Three Kingdoms), 
chap.4) 
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followers came voluntarily for protection, while others had been called up 
by offiCially-sponsored conscription, and then had their allegiance trans­
ferred gradually to their individual commanders;23 and the same process 
took place as the government agricultural garrisons were broken up to the 
advantage of private interests. Despite official programmes for settlement, 
numbers of people failed to receive any allocation of land,24 while others 
found the protection of a powerful magnate more attractive and secure than 
the risks of individual enterprise and the demands of taxation. 25 Through­
out the countrySide, land-owners were able to deal with their tenants and 
dependents through a system of barter and exchange of service, and it was 
difficult for any government agency to obtain information or to enforce 
their demands. Taxation and other levies were thus obtained by negotia­
tion on the basis of quotas rather than by formal assessment of value and 
obligation. 
In an attempt to control this expansion of great and their dependencies, 
the imperial administration promulgated a law of land registration (zhantian 
r!iEIV. In theory, at least, the system provided that each individual should 
register his land with the government, paying tax on the amount involved, 
but receiving title in return. As an extension of this measure, the system 
sought to limit the size of land-holdings throughout the empire, proclaim­
ing that each male was entitled to seventy mou and each female thirty. 
There appears, however, to have been no restriction according to age or 
family status, so children and old people could contribute to the legal 
entitlement of their family. 26 
It has been observed that under this system a husband and wife together 
would have an allowance of one hundred mou, the basic figure in the well­
field system described by Mencius. Searching for reforms to solve the 
problems of their time, and observing the excessive land-holdings and the 
extending power of the great families, several writers of Later Han had 
proposed the restoration of this ideal, and Sirna Lang 5],�M suggested the 
scheme to Cao Cao without success. 27 In real terms, given the interests and 
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strength of the opposition, a policy of equal distribution had not been 
practicable in the past, and it was even less so now. 
Unlike the ketian, which probably represented a real programme of 
allocation usefully carried out in some regions, the zhantian was no more 
than an attempt to establish the principle that each person was entitled to 
the registered possession of a certain amount of land, with any excess 
subject to ultimate control and possible confiscation. The system was not 
intended for immediate operation, but represented a policy which might 
be enforced at some later time. 
Even this, however, was optimistic, for the government was compelled 
to accept the right of nobles and officials to hold land in addition to the 
regular allocation, and, most importantly, there was no way to control the 
numbers of client families who had attached themselves or had been taken 
into service by powerful clans. In partial recognition of the Situation, the 
Jin allowed privileged and official families to 'protect' a limited number of 
retainers and tenants. 28 As with the registration of land, the government 
evidently hoped that if it gave formal recognition to the existence of these 
clients it would thereby establish some principle of authority, and the 
situation could be brought under control later. Considering the political 
support which the Sima family required from the great clans, however, and 
the fact that the officials administering the restrictions were themselves 
either members of such families or readily intimidated by their local power, 
there was never any great likelihood that the imperial government would 
be able to enforce its writ against the wishes and interests of its powerful 
subjects. 
One can see signs of weakness in the records of population. The 
'Treatise of Geography' in fin shu presents only rounded and summary 
figures for the numbers of households in each administrative area, in no 
way comparable to the two Han histories, which give figures for both house­
holds and individuals. Moreover, where the Later Han figures, from about 
140 AD, have a total population for the empire of 9.7 million households 
and almost 50 million individuals, the Jin figures of about 280 record only 
2.5 million households and 16 million individuals, one-fifth of the Han 
numbers. 29 
Though the years of civil war had certainly taken their toll of the 
population in the heartland of China and brought a dramatic decline along 
the northern frontier, we have also observed the remarkable development 
of colonization in the area south of the Yangzi formerly controlled by Wu. 30 
The population of China may have declined since the time of Later Han, 
but the loss was certainly not so great as the figures would indicate. 
Bielenstein has shown that the numbers of households given by fin shu for 
each commandery represent a taxation list, not a true censusY They may 
indeed be best understood as a series of quotas, indicating the assessed 
value and obligation of each unit, with no more than an incidental 
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/cussed by Hsu Cho-yun, Han agriculture: 
the formation of early Chinese agrarian 
economy (200 Be-AD 220) (Seattle: Univer­
sity of Washington Press, 1980), pp.9-10. 
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with commentary by Liu Zhao (sixth cen­
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Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern An­
tiquities [BMFEA} 19 (1947), pp.125-63, at 
125-8. 
30 3K&WJ I, pp.19-20, and Map 3. 
31 Bielenstein, "Census: pp.125-32, 153-5. 
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32 Analogous to this would be the value of 
a block of land as assessed by a modem 
government for tax or rating purposes: this 
formal and official value need have little to 
do with the price the property might fetch 
on the open market. 
One must observe that the limited infor­
mation available in the jS Treatise of Geog­
raphy' does not wholly demonstrate the in­
adequacy of lin, for the treatises were not 
given their final form until Tang, and there 
may have been other records which were lost 
in the intervening centuries. On the other 
hand, the impression of superficial adminis­
tration is reinforced by all sources, and it 
seems clear that the government relied for its 
revenues on a general estimate of yield rather 
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assessment. 
33 3K&WJ I, pp.1S-20, 23. 
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Bing province Qing province 
PY Puyang 
LP Luoping BH Beihai RC Rencheng 
SD Shandong CG Changguan TS Taishan 
CY Chengyuan 
Jiprovince IN Jinan Yiprovince 
AP Anping LA Lean XD Xindu 
BH Bohai QI Qi 
BL Boling Yong province 
GY Gaoyang Siproince BD Beidi 
HJ Hejian GP Guangping XP Xinping 
JL Julu TQ Tunqiu 
LL Leling W Wei You province 
PY Pingyuan yp Yangping GN Huangning 
QH Qinghe SG Shanggu 
Z Zhao Xu province 
ZS Zhongshan DH Donghai Yuprovince 
ZW Zhangwu DN Donghuan AF Anfeng 
LY Langye Lg Liang 
Liang � province PC Pengcheng LU Lu 
XP Xiapi P Pei 
GH Guanghan Q Qiao 
Yan province RN Runan 
Liang iR: province CL Chenliu RY Ruyin 
DP Dongping XC Xiangcheng 
Qin province GP Gaoping YC Yingchuan 
TS Tianshui JB Jibei yy Yuyang 
JY Jiyang 
relationship to the real number of people in each area.32 As to the numbers 
of individuals, we have seen how the records of the surrendered states of 
Shu-Han and Wu present far lower figures than those for the same area 
recorded by Later Han,33 and the total given by jin shu follows the same 
pattern. It must be assumed that these reported the people under the direct 
control of the administration for the purposes of COfV(�e or conscription, 
while the remainder of the population contrived to avoid such levies, either 
by keeping at a physical distance from government agencies or, very 
frequently, by sheltering under the protection of great families. In practice, 
the governments of the rival states, and the empire of Jin which succeeded 
them, had only limited access to the resources which they nominally 
controlled. The problem, moreover, was not just one of administrative 
energy and competence, for the growth of economic and political power 
among the landed families, already established during Later Han, had accel­
erated in the years of turmoil, and there was now no meaningful machinery 
by which a government might restore the authority of the old empire. 
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Inspectors, who held primarily no more 
than reporting powers, to Governors (mu 
iBj. ; also rendered as 'Shepherds'), who were 
entitled to direct executive control over their 
prOVinces, see, for example, de Crespigny, 
"Inspection and surveillance officials under 
the two Han dynasties,» in State and law in 
BastAsia, ed. Dieter Eikemeier and Herbert 
Franke (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1981), 
pp.67, and Gen erals of the South (Canberra: 
Australian National University, 1990), pp. 
61, 116 n.53. 
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of the well-field system (see n.27 above), 
Sima Lang spoke favourably of the five-rank 
system of nobility attributed to the Zhou 
dynasty, and he particularly emphasized the 
advantage of giving substantial military re­
sponsibility to local government officials: 
SGZ 15/Wei IS, 467-8. 
35 As part of the general programme of 
disarmament after the conquest of Wu, an 
edict removed formal military responsibility 
from the Inspectors, though it is evident that 
they retained some capacity in times of 
emergency. See ZZ1] 81, 2575, trans!' An­
thony Bruce Fairbank, "Kingdom and prov­
ince in the Western Chin: regional power 
and the Eight Kings insurrection." (MA diss., 
Seattle: University of Washington, 1986), 
p.85; and Yen Keng-wang, History of the 
regional and local administration in 
China. Pa nlI: The Wei, Tsin, Southern and 
Nonhero dyn asties, 2 vols (Taipei: Institute 
of History and Philology, Academia Sinica, 
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shu of Wang Yin. 
36 jS 24, 729, the 'Treatise of Officials', 
discussed by Yen, Regional and local ad­
ministration,l: 87-111, and Fairbank, "King­
dom and province: pp.75-104. During the 
years of active warfare, some officers were 
given responsibility as Area Commanders 
(dudu fII�) or Area Commanders-in-Chief 
(da dudu*�if), Commanders (dutf)or 
Supervisors (jum IV of military affairs 
(junshi .IJ) in one or more provinces, 
and these appointments could be held ei­
ther in addition to a provincial inspectorate 
or as a separate command. Eventually, the 
position of Area Commander, with one form 
or another of special powers (jie in), was 
established as a high substantive rank in the 
official hierarchy. 
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In these circumstances, unable to establish full control over the empire, 
the Jin were compelled to make use of their family connections. During the 
years of conflict, contending warlords and governments had roughly main­
tained the Han structure of local administration based upon provinces, 
commanderies and counties. Because of the threat of mutiny and separatism, 
Inspectors rather than Governors had been appointed, and there had been 
varying policies for, and some debate on, the granting of military responsi­
bilities.34 Based on a practice adopted during the civil wars and under Wei, 
then confirmed by Jin, a new pattern was developed whereby Inspectors 
were appointed primarily as civil officials,35 while another hierarchy, that of 
Area Commanders, was appointed above them. 
Classed in the second of the Nine Ranks, the same as ministers at court 
and generals of the army, Area Commanders possessed full military power 
within their territory, and their authority was dominant in the empire outside 
the capital. 36 Moreover, in a clear demonstration of faith in family loyalty, the 
government of Jin entrusted members of the imperial Sirna family with a 
substantial number of these appointments, particularly along the northern 
frontier and in the North China plain.37 By contrast, the competent official 
Zhang Hua was removed from his post in the north-eastem province of You 
because of suspicions about his 10yalty.38 
So the government of China, reunited under Sirna Yan, was still weak and 
ineffective in comparison with Han. It did not succeed in establishing real 
control over its most powerful subjects, while on the other hand, as time 
passed, the generation of leaders who had given personal loyalty to Sirna Yan 
and his predecessors during the years of their rise to power gradually died 
out. To maintain its position, the court relied upon members of the imperial 
clan, established as long-term rulers with military power over substantial 
territories across the empire. It was a policy which had often been urged by 
scholars of the Confucian tradition, but it had been consistently rejected by 
Qin, Han and Wei. The Sirna family of Jin now put it to the test. 
EmpressJia and the Eight Princes (290-306) 
Sirna Yan, EmperorWu oOin, died on 16 May 290 at the age of fifty-five, 
and he was succeeded by his thirty-year-old son Sirna Zhong ��l{, later 
known as Emperor Hui 5.39 
Sirna Zhong had been appointed Heir Apparent �T in 267, and in 272 
he was married to the Lady Jia Nanfeng J(ifj§l., daughter of the minister Jia 
Chong J(Jt, an old supporter of the Sirna family who had played a leading 
role in the fighting against Cao Mao "�in 260.40Though there was a general 
anxiety, from accummulating evidence, that Sirna Zhong was mentally 
disabled and unfit to rule, Sirna Yan maintained him as his heir and accepted 
the alliance with the Jia family. 
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On this vital question, Sima Yan is said to have accepted the persuasions 
of his first empress, the Lady Yang Yan �;1!!,41 but the decision was not 
unreasonable. As the Lady Yang observed, to discard the senior son, even 
when he was not the most suitable, would open debate on other candidates, 
and this could easily develop into a general struggle for power. Sima Zhong, 
moreover, now had a son of his own, Sima Yu 5J,�Jl, born of the Lady Xie 
1&, one of Sima Yan's own concubines who had been sent to teach him the 
arts of the bed chamber. In 290, Sima Yu was thirteen, and he was a young 
man of outstanding quality. 42 
Before this, the Empress Yang Yan on her deathbed had recommended 
that her cousin Yang Zhi �;k should succeed her,43 and Yang Jun ���!t, 
father of the Lady Yang Zhi, had acquired great influence with the Emperor. 44 
In his own last illness, Sima Yan sought to establish an irIterim admirIistration 
to guide the dynasty until Sima Yu could take substantive power. He had an 
edict prepared that his senior uncle Sima liang 5J,��, son of Sima Yi by a 
concubirIe, should become the regent and head of government jointly with 
Yang JunAS and he sent three of his younger sons into the provirIces as area 
commanders: Sima Wei 5J ,�� was irI JirIg if: provirJce, Sima Yun 5J,�ft 
was in Yang ti, and Sima Jian 5J,�* was in the north-west 46 Military 
control of the provirIces was thus almost entirely in the hands of the Sima 
family: Sima Wei, Sima Yun and Sima Jian controlled the south of the Yangzi 
and the north-west, the northern part of the North ChirIa plain was held by 
Sima Lun i'ij ,�{�, also a son of Sima Yi by a concubine,47 and the territories 
south of the Yellow river were govemed by Sima Lun's brother Sima Yong 
'5],�lI'a and his nephew Sima Huang 5J��.48 
In accepting two empresses from the Yang clan, Sima Yan had estab­
lished at his court a powerful group of relatives by marriage, but he was also 
concerned about the ambitions of the Jia family.49 He eVidently believed, 
however, that the authority he had granted Sima liang, together with the 
regional powers of the princes, would be sufficient to protect the position 
of the imperial house. In fact, his death brought immediate conflict. 
It was the Yang family that took the initiative. With the support of his 
daughter the Empress, Yang Jun suppressed the edict granting regent's 
authority to Sima liang, and after Sima Yan died he took that power for 
himself. In fear of Yang Jun, Sima liang made no effective response to the 
challenge, but fled from the capital and took up the position he had held 
earlier, as Area Commander irI Yu m province, based upon Xuchang al�. 50 
The Empress Jia, however, had no such irIhibitions: on 23 April 291 she 
organized a coup, with palace guards under her own command, to destroy 
Yang Jun, his family and their supporters. The Empress-Dowager Yang was 
deposed, and Sima liang and the senior official Wei Guan �J!I were irIvited 
to take over the reins of governmentS1 
Thus far, the EmpressJia could claim to have been acting in accordance 
with the wishes of her late father-irI-Iaw. The situation was confused, how-
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(238--274) is in jS 3l . 
42 The biography of Sima Yu (277-300) is in 
))53, and that of the LadyXie is in))31 at 968. 
43 The biography of the Lady Yang Zhi 
(254-291)  is in jS 31 . 
44 The biography of Yang Jun (d.291 ) is in 
jS 40. 
45 jS 3, 80--81 ,  and ZZ1] 82, 2599; on Sima 
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46 The biography of Sima Wei (271-291) i s  
in  jS 59, and those of Sima Yun (272-300) 
and Sima Jian (262-291 ) are in jS 64. 
47 The biography of Sima Lun (d.301 ) is in 
jS 59. 
48 The biography of Sima Yong (d.301 ) is in 
jS 38, and that of Sima Huang (d.296) is in 
jS 37. 
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50 jS 4, 89, and ZZ1]82, 2600. 
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52 The biography of Pei Wei ( 267-300) is in 
jS 35. On his position as a Confucianist 
opposed to the nihilism of his day, see 
Etienne Balazs, "Entre revolte nihiliste et 
evasion mystique. Les courants intellectuels 
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Asiatische Studienl Etudes asiatiques 2 
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53 The biography ofJia Mi (d.300) is injS40. 
He was the son of another daughter of Jia 
Chong, adopted back into the Jia line age. 
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tury AD above: in the early 120s, Emperor An 
destroyed the family of the Empress-Dowa­
ger Deng; and the family of his Empress Yan 
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140s, during the Liang clan hegemony, two 
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Huan destroyed Liang Ji in 159. See, for 
example, Bielenstein, "Wang Mang, the res­
toration of the Han dynasty, and Later Han," 
in CC 1, pp.284-6. 
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ever, by Sima Wei, who returned from his appointment inJing province and 
sought a role in the politics of the ca pitat. Intriguing against his elder kinsman 
Sima liang, he obtained approval from the Empress to remove him and Wei 
Guan, and on 25 July 291, just three months after their appointment, the two 
men were assassinated. Almost immediately afterwards, on the advice of her 
minister Zhang Hua, the Empress Jia had Sima Wei arrested and executed 
on the charge of forging an imperial edict. 
With this last twist of treachery the Empress Jia had gained full control of 
the capital, and for the next several years the highest positions at court were 
in the hands of her family and their supporters. For a time Sima Yong, recalled 
from the north-west, was given formal charge of the secretariat, but he had no 
real authority and in 296 he returned to his fonner territory. General adminis­
tration was maintained by the veteran Zhang Hua and the youthful Pei Wei 
�Kti, 52 while the empress' nephew Jia Mi J(�. held considerable influence 
at court and was a noted patron of leading men of letters. 53 
In many respects the period of Jia family dominance resembled the 
occasions in Han when consort families had acquired similar power over the 
government, and though the regime has been described as a usurpation, it 
was not incompetent. There were substantial problems on the frontiers, but 
they were coped with, and despite the military potential of their regional 
powers the Sima princes appear to have accepted the destruction of Sima 
liang and Sima Wei, and the somewhat cavalier treatment of Sima Yong, 
without great concern and certainly without taking action. In fact, the 
struggles at the capital had little effect upon arrangements in the provinces 
provided that the imperial title remained in proper hands. 
The situation, however, changed dramatically and fatally when the 
Empress decided to remove Sima Yu from his position as Heir Apparent. 
Sima Yu turned twenty in 297, and the time was approaching when he might 
seek authority of his own or become the centre of a dissident faction. He and 
Jia Mi, moreover, were clear enemies, and if the Heir Apparent came to the 
throne the future of the Jia faction was very uncertain. Early in 300, therefore, 
Sima Yu was tricked into signing a treasonous letter, and the Emperor was 
persuaded to dismiss him. Three months later, on 27 April, the Empress Jia 
had the young man killed. 
Once again, this was a pattern of conduct often observed during Han. A 
consort family which had held regency powers was always in trouble when 
the true ruler came to maturity, and one side or the other would frequently 
resort to intrigue and bloodshed. 54 The unfortunate Sima Yu had presented 
just such a threat, and events followed a sad tradition. At this point, however, 
in contrast to the house of Han, other members of the imperial clan of Jin 
were in position to defend their interests. 
At the time of Sima Yu's death, the two surviving sons of Sima Yi, Sima 
Yong and Sima Lun, were stationed at Luoyang ��". Sima Lun had 
transferred from Ji to Yong � province but in 296 he was recalled to the 
capital and was replaced by Sima Yong. Sima Yong, for his part, had lately 
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been reappointed to fonnal control of the imperial secretariat and ills place 
in the north-west was taken by his cousin Sima Yung '5J ,�II. ss On 7 May 300 
Sima Lun and his allies seized power at the capital. They imprisoned the 
Empress Jia, forcing her to commit suicide a few days later, and they killed 
Jia Mi, Zhang Hua, and Pei Wei. Sima Lun became Chancellor of State and 
appointed his relatives and supporters to the leading positions. 
In this respect, the policy of the Jin dynasty had been remarkably 
successful. Unlike the pattern of Han, the imperial family had been able to 
resist and destroy the over-ambitious consort group, and POWL- was now 
returned to the Sima family. Despite Sima Lun's seniority in the dan, 
however, he was not himself popular, there was objection to his counsellor 
Sun Xiu �3'S, and it was claimed that he was acting without proper authority. 
In the autumn of 300, Sima Yun attempted a coup against Sima Lun, but was 
killed in the skirmishing which followed. Then, on 3 February 301, Sima Lun 
forced a form of abdication upon Emperor Hui and claimed the imperial title 
for himself. 
Though there were earlier, similar examples of such seizure of power, 
it was yet not acceptable to usurp the throne from one's own kinsman, and 
in April 301 Sima Ying ii],�m and Sima Yih '5J�x, younger brothers of 
Emperor Hui, joined forces with Sima Jiong ii],tt;Pt\3, Area Commander at 
Xuchang, and came from the east against Luoyang. They defeated Sima Lun 
and forced him to commit suicide, they restored Emperor Hui to his imperial 
state, and then Sima Jiong used his local military power to take over the 
regency. 56 
Again, though it was one thing to run the empire as a family affair, there 
was great room for disagreement as to which individual should hold the 
highest position. Sima Lun's ambition had brought his destruction, but in May 
302, the death of the last of the sons of the late Heir Apparent Sima Yu caused 
another dynastic crisis, for there was now no clear successor to Emperor Hui. 
Sima Ying hoped for the nomination, and he resented the dominant position 
taken by the more distant relative SimaJiong, while Sima Yung from the west 
also sought a role. In complex intrigue during the last days of the Chinese 
year, Sima Ying and Sima Yung involved Sima Yih in their rivalry with Sima 
Jiong, but when Sima Jiong sought to destroy Sima Yih, Sima Yih turned the 
tables on him and took his place at the head of government. 
Sima Yih appears to have been the most competent of the princes, and 
also the most popular, but disorder at the capital had already begun to 
undermine the authority of the central government. There was continuing 
rebellion in Sichuan, increasing trouble in Henan, and after twelve months 
Sima Yih was attacked from the east by Sima Ying and from the west by Sima 
Yung. In an energetic campaign, Sima Yih inflicted heavy defeat on Sima 
Ying's forces and held off the army of Sima Yung commanded by Zhang Fang 
�15. S7 Then, however, he was betrayed and arrested in his own camp by 
Sima Yue ii.J !U�, member of a cadet lineage,S8 and on 19 March 304 Zhang 
Fang had Sima Yih burnt at the stake. 
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Liang and Sima Wei, who appear in that 
chapter but who died in the struggle against 
the EmpressJia in 291, should not be listed 
among the troublesome eight. Zhao Qi's list, 
which is now generally followed, begins 
with Sima Lun, who took up arms against 
the central government in 300, and then 
includes Sima Yong, Sirna Yun, Sima Jiong, 
Sima Ying, Sima Yung, Sima Yih, and finally 
Sima Yue, who completed his victory in 306. 
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On 1 May 304, with Sima Yung's approval, Sima Ying named himseifHeir 
Apparent, and removed several government offices to his own capital at Ye 
JIl. Though Sima Yue still held the Emperor at Luoyang, he felt increasing 
resentment at the shift of power to the new regime in the east, and in the 
summer of 304 he led an army against Yeo On 9 September, at the battle of 
Tangyin �I!A, his troops were utterly defeated. Emperor Hui was wounded 
by three arrows, his attendant Xi Shao frB*g, son of the poet Xi Kang frail, 
was killed in front of him, and he fell into the hands of Sima Ying. 
A few weeks later, however, the general WangJun Itt, who had been 
appointed to command in the north by the Jia regime and was threatened 
by Sima Ying, came south against Ye with an army including a substantial 
contingent of non-Chinese auxiliaries. S9 Taking the Emperor with him, Sirna 
Ying fled in panic to Luoyang. He was completely discredited, and real 
power was now held by Zhang Fang, who garrisoned the capital with the 
most powerful army of the region. Soon afterwards, Zhang Fang brought the 
court west to Chang'an ��, where he could also supervise his nominal 
superior, Sirna Yung. 
The new regime, however, was surrounded by enemies. The armies of 
Wang Jun continued their advance, and there was an additional threat from 
the Xiongnu under Liu Yuan roVII in present-day Shanxi. From his fief terri­
tory of Donghai *i1i, moreover, and with the aid of his brothers, Sirna Yue 
gathered forces to renew the challenge, and from the summer of 305, in a 
multitude of engagements, including the siege and capture of Xu chang, Ye, 
and Luoyang, he advanced towards the west. Early in 306, in an attempt to 
come to terms, Sima Yung assassinated Zhang Fang, but on 5 June 306 
Chang'an was captured and sacked by an army ofWuhuan ,t%m and Xianbi 
under the command ofWangJun's generaiJi Hong ��5L. Emperor Hui was 
returned to Luoyang, Sima Yung and Sima Ying were captured and killed, 
and Sirna Yue took control of the court. 
Emperor Hui died on 8 January 307-there were rumours Sirna Yue had 
him poisoned-and he was succeeded by his younger brother Sima Zhi 
iiJ��, twenty-fifth son of Sima Yan.6O The new emperor was not so 
incompetent as his brother, but he played no real part in politics and left the 
conduct of affairs to Sima Yue. In fact, however, for all the ruthlessness with 
which he had pursued his ambitions, the regime maintained by Sima Yue was 
little more than a fragile facade, and the Yongjia *_ reign period (307-
312) was one of continued anarchy. The territory north of the Yellow river 
was contested ground, there was trouble in the valley of the Huai, Sichuan 
remained in rebellion, and in 308 the bandit Wang Mi ..::E. from Shandong 
captured Xuchang city. 
The victory of Sima Yue had ended the internecine conflict, but that 
conclusion brought exhaustion and despair. Though the brothers and 
cousins of the Sima clan had indeed defended their imperial position, six 
years of turmoil had produced a ferocious, meaningless record of treachery, 
murder and war. 61 The credit of the government and the imperial family was 
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ruined, and there was no authority that might restore the state or re-establish 
a position against the forces which threatened from the north. 
Map 2 
The Peoples of the Steppe and the Collapse of Western jin 
Since written sources for the study of early East Asia are in Chinese, it 
is not surprising that most of the history has been discussed from a Chinese 
point of view. Despite this bias, however, there is ample evidence to show 
that the traditional attitude towards non-Chinese neighbours of the empire 
was arrogant, aggressive, short-sighted and untrustworthy. When such 
people were brought under control, notably in the south and the west, they 
were oppressed and exploited by the Chinese government and its citizens, 
and on the northern frontier, imperial governments sought only to force the 
aliens into their tribute system. 1b.ere was no concept of independence, let 
alone equality of esteem, treaties were seldom made and never kept, and 
trade was regarded as a means of control rather than as the sensible ex­
change of gocx:ls for value. It was consistent policy that any large grouping 
should be divided and destroyed, even though the result, often enough, 
left the frontier vulnerable to a multitude of petty, troublesome war­
leaders.62 
Unattractive though it may have been, that policy was successful for 
much of the Han period. At the end of the first century AD, however, the great 
victory of Dou Xian over the Northern Xiongnu destroyed the political 
Northern China in 
the early fourth century 
62 I have presented my arguments for these 
general st atements in my work Northern 
!rontier(Canberra: Australian National Uni­
versi ty, 1984), where I discuss such matters 
as the policy of Wang Mang I � towards 
the Xiongnu and the Wuhuan, the great 
campaigns of Dou Xian •• , and the op­
pression of the Qiang � people in the 
region of present-day Gansu. In particular, 
in Chapter 10, I observe the contrast in 
policies between China and Rome: the Ro­
m ans were prepared to establish a compara­
tively pe aceful and stable relationship with 
client st ates on their eastern frontiers, and 
they were prepared to grant ci tizenship to 
alien peoples. 
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tribes of the second century AD," Papers on 
Far Eastem History 15 (1977): 1-44. 
64 SGZ ?IJ/Wei ?IJ, 838-9. 
65 HHS 89/79, 296�; SGZ l/Wei I, 47; JS 
97, 2548; de Crespigny, Northemfrontier, 
pp.352-4; and P eter A. Bood berg, "Two 
notes on the history of the Chinese frontier," 
Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 1 (1936): 
283--307. 
66 Even before the trouble with Tanshihuai, 
there had been a marked withdrawal of 
Chinese administration from the north-west 
in the early 140s, after rebellions by the 
Q iang and the Xiongnu and troubles in 
Liang province from 184 on destroyed the 
position of the Han government in the 
north-west: de Crespigny, Northern fron­
tier, pp.l 23, 309-12, 146-62; also Gustav 
Haloun, "The Liang-chou rebellion, 184-
221 AD," Asia Major I ,  n.s. (1949-50): 119-
38. 
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equilibrium in the north, and the second centwy saw an enfeebled Chinese 
government faced with a multitude of disparate threats, from the rebellions 
of the Qiang people in the west to the rise of aggressive Xianbi tribes which 
came to replace the federations of the Xiongnu. In the time of Emperor ling 
ii, the Xianbi war-leader Tanshihuai :tIEw. acquired general control over 
his people, destroyed a major Chinese army, and sent raiding parties year 
after year against the frontier. 63 
By good fortune for the Chinese, the successors of Tanshihuai lacked his 
authority, and the pirate kingdom fell into disarray after his death in the early 
180s. For a few years at the end of Han the Xianbi leader Kebineng � Ji� 
restored some semblance of Tanshihuai's dOminion, and was given title as 
ally by Cao Pi, but Chinese diplomacy aided his enemies, and when Kebi­
neng was murdered in 235 the new federation also collapsed. 64 
Elsewhere, in the north-east Cao Cao had destroyed the Wuhuan alliance 
under Tadun ijJ ttl in 207, and he brought the Wei river valley under control 
at the battle of Huayin ¥� in 2 1 1 .  In 216 he settled the remnant Xiongnu 
in five divisions in the present-day provinces of Shanxi and Shaanxi, with a 
formal capital under Chinese supervision at Pingyang 3Jl�i on the Fen river, 
and hostages at Ye city to procure their good behaviour. 65 Thereafter, in the 
region of Manchuria the campaigns of GuanqiuJian ,�� in 244-5 broke the 
kingdom of KoguryO, and in the west the Qiang and Di 1£ peoples of the 
Wei valley and present-day Gansu were generally held under control by the 
contending forces of Wei and Shu-Han. When Sima Yan took his imperial 
title in 265, the non-Chinese people along the northern borders were dis­
ordered and divided. 
The general strategic position, however, was far less satisfactory than it 
had been before. At its greatest extent, the territory of Later Han had included 
all the northern loop of the Yellow river beyond the Ordas, and the north 
of present-day Shanxi and Hebei, but during the second centwy, distur­
bances amongst the Xiongnu and the Qiang, and the attacks of the Xianbi, 
removed great areas from the control of the imperial government. 66 Cao Cao 
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and his successors could do no more than stabilize the situation, and as a 
result, under Wei andJin, present-day Shanxi as far south as Taiyuan and the 
Fen river was occupied by groups of Xiongnu, while the Xianbi were estab­
lished in the Sanggan valley and the region of present-day Huhehot. In the 
Wei valley, during the late 260s and the 270s, the Xianbi Jifu Shujineng and 
the Xiongnu Uu Meng presented some embarrassment to the new dynasty,67 
and there was further trouble in 294 after Sima Lun, as Area Commander, 
sought to establish tighter control. The rebellion spread from the Xiongnu 
to the Qiang and the Di, with the Di leader Qi Wannian JlfJil � claiming an 
imperial title in 296, and the trouble was not suppressed until 299.68 
The dangers from the non-Chinese occupation of the north and north­
west had not gone unnoticed. In 280, after the suppression of Uu Meng and 
the defeat ofWu, the censorial official Guo Qin '�iX urged that the Xiongnu 
should be expelled to the north,69 and in 299 the junior officer Jiang Tong 
rrm presented his "Essay on Shifting the Western Barbarians" .tfEtiif9, 
arguing along traditional lines that the Land Within the Passes was the heart 
of the nation and the Qiang and Di should be resettled elsewhere.7o There 
was, in fact, some attempt to drive the non-Chinese people south into 
present-day Sichuan, but in practical terms such a solution was impossible: 
Chinese settlement in the Wei valley had long been in decline, the economic 
use of the country had changed from peasant farming to mixed agriculture 
and pasture, and the government was by no means strong enough to enforce 
such a mass migration. Within a year, moreover, the turmoil at court was 
bringing all into ruin. 
At first, the quarrels of the imperial clan had been limited to the territory 
about Luoyang and Chang'an. In 304, however, when Sima Ying held the 
Emperor hostage at Ye, the situation changed. Wang Jun's attack from the 
north was mounted with the support of Wuhuan and Xianbi, who acquired 
their first taste for the plunder and slaughter of a major Chinese city. As the 
invaders drew near, moreover, Sima Ying released the Xiongnu hostage 
prince Uu Yuan, hoping that he would rally his people and return to the 
rescue. Uu Yuan did collect an army, but he was too late to help Sima Ying 
and instead he raised his own claim to imperial power. From a base in the 
Fen river valley, and relying upon his lineage from the Shanyu ¥ T of the 
Xiongnu on one side and from a princess of Han on the other, he declared 
himself first King then Emperor of Han.71 
Sima Teng ii.L�Ii, younger brother of Sima Yue, had been responsible 
for Bing * province,72 but in fear of Uu Yuan he abandoned his pOSition 
and left it to the Inspector Uu Kun ,gJlt?3 Sima Teng sought to maintain 
himself at Ye, but inJune YJ7 the city was sacked and Sima Teng was killed 
by the banditJi Sang �� and his associate Shi Le Efh, a man from the Jie 
in tribe of the Xiongnu.74 Sima Yue's forces drove the invaders back a few 
weeks later, and Ji Sang was killed, but Shi Le transferred his allegiance to 
Uu Yuan, and by YJ9 their armies threatened all north China. Though Uu 
Yuan died in 310, his son Uu Cong ,gil! maintained the offensive,75 and the 
1 59 
67 See p.145 above. 
68 See, for example,]S 4, 94-5; also ZZ7]82, 
2616 and 83, 2623. 
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the Parallel Annals, JS 1 02. 
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death of Sima Yue early in 311 only added to the confusion within the 
government of Jin. On 13 July, after a massive defeat of the defending army, 
Shi Le stormed Luoyang, sacked the city, and took Sima Zhi, Emperor Huai, 
as a prisoner to Liu Cong's capital at Pingyang.76 
With this catastrophe, the central power of Jin was ended. In the west, 
Chang' an also fell to the Xiongnu but was reca ptured by loyalist forces with 
Qiang and Di auxiliaries. Sima Ye i3j�fjl, the eleven-year-old nephew of 
Sima Zhi, was proclaimed Heir Apparent, and in 313, after Sima Zhi had been 
put to death in captivity, he ascended the throne. T7 For a few more years, with 
local support from the west and north-west of the empire, and intervention 
by the loyal Liu Kun from Bing province, the court at Chang'an maintained 
a tenuous existence, but the city was steadily encircled by the forces of Liu 
Cong, and the defenders were starved into submission at the end of 316. 
Sima Ye was also taken into exile, and was killed a few months later. 
Elsewhere in the empire, the waning power of Jin was restricted to Bing 
and You provinces in the far north, and to Jianye with the lands south of the 
Yangzi, former territory of Wu. Sima Rui i3j,�1f, Prince of Langye �� and 
a great-grandson of Sima Yi, had held command atJianye since 307. He was 
attacked by Shi Le in 312, but the invaders, hampered by three months of 
rain, could make no headway south of the Huai. So Jianye became a place 
of refuge from the ruin of the north, and Sima Rui took title as King of Jin 
li in 317. The follOWing year, after the death of Sima Ye, he proclaimed 
himself Emperor, and the dynasty, now known as Eastern Jin, was thus 
revived. 78 
In Bing province, from his base atJinyang ��i near present-dayTaiyuan, 
Liu Kun obtained the aid of the Tuoba 3U� group of the Xianbi, traditional 
enemies of the Xiongnu, who occupied the northern part of present-day 
Shanxi and the region of Huhehot 79 His own position, however, was weak. 
In 310 he was compelled to send his son as hostage in order to obtain troops 
from his allies, and he depended increasingly upon his relationship with the 
chieftain Tuoba Yilu ��¥afJa. In 314 the two leaders mounted a sortie to 
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relieve Chang'an, and Tuoba Yilu was awarded the title of King of Dai f1:;I. 
Two years later, however, as Shi Le extended his power across the North 
China plain, Tuoba Yilu was assassinated and his clansmen rejected the 
alliance withJin. Liu Kun fled north-east to the Duan $9: group of the Xianbi, 
but was killed there in 318. 
In somewhat similar fashion, Wang Jun in You province maintained an 
alliance with the Murong M� group of the Xianbi, who had risen to power 
in Manchuria after the defeat of Koguryo by Guanqiu Jian in the middle of 
the third century, and consolidated their position through marriage alliances 
with the Duan and a successful aggressive policy towards their neighbours, 
the Puyo �� and the Yuwen �)( Xianbi.80 Disconcertingly, however, 
the government of Murong Hui ��J;i; , who had held power among his 
people since 285 and had created an orderly government with numerous 
Chinese advisers and officials, was more attractive to refugees from central 
China than the regime of Wang Jun. Wang Jun had sought to act as patron 
and overlord to Murong Hui, but he was deserted by his own people and 
his allies, and he was taken and killed by Shi I.e in 314. By contrast, in 317, 
Murong Hui established contact with theJin court atJianye, and was awarded 
the title of general and the rank of duke. 
This last sad failure exemplifies the critical weakness of the empire: that 
Chinese people should prefer an alien frontier state to the protection of their 
own administrator. The destruction of the capitals and the ruin of Western 
Jin was not just a matter of powerful barbarian forces pressing against the 
empire; it came essentially from the irresponsible feuding that had bedevilled 
the imperial family since the death of Sima Yan more than twenty years 
before. Where people had looked for stability and competence their rulers 
had shown them futile selfishness and cruelty. Such a succession of disorders 
would cut to the heart of any government, and as they were robbed of their 
faith and their confidence the former subjects of the empire turned away from 
those who had betrayed them. 
Patterns of the Third Century 
Looking overall at the period from the collapse of Later Han at the end 
of the second century AD to the ruin of Western Jin at the beginning of the 
fourth century, one may observe two major developments of lasting 
importance for the history of China: the first is the development of the 
Chinese position south of the Yangzi; the second is the changing economic 
and social structure of the Chinese world, and the devastating effect this had 
upon the basic loyalties which had supported the traditional imperial state. 
The impetus which the state ofWu gave to Chinese control over the lands 
of the south has already been discussed. The situation at the end of the 
second century permitted the initial establishment of a local regime in­
dependent of the north, and then the energy of the Sun family and their 
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associates developed the resources of the region by colonizing areas 
fonnerly untouched by the government of Han. Though the rulers of Wu 
could not in the end withstand the united power of the north and the west, 
it was through their achievement that a base was found for the survival of 
a truncated Chinese state after the fall of Western Jin.81 
On the second matter, while it is easy to criticize the political weakness 
of Wei and the appallir1g instability of WesternJin, we should recognize the 
degree to which the old regime of Han had been destroyed in the first years 
of civil war. The warlords who struggled for power at the beginning of the 
third century held their forces together by loose bonds of personal loyalty, 
and even as the three new regional states developed some formal political 
structures, the real network of power was based upon family and local self­
interest 82 In such circumstances, one should rather admire the achievement 
of Cao Cao, his rivals, and his successors, in creating workable institutions 
from a situation of internecine chaos, than criticize them for the weaknesses 
of their constructions. 
In the end, however, as the state of Western Jin fell into ruin, anecdotes 
of two men, the aesthete Wang Yan .::Em and the statesman Zhang Hua, 
may be presented as examples of the moral weakness that lay at the heart 
of the state. 
Wang Yan was one of the most brilliant men of his time, skilled in the 
sophistries of pure conversation, a scholar both of diplomacy and of 
xuanxue �!¥.83 At Luoyang in 311 he was captured by Shi Le, who asked 
him about the failure of Jin. Wang Yan's answers were clear and elegant, and 
Shi Le spoke with him for several days. But Wang Yan also sought to explain 
how he had held himself aloof from such meanness, and that those errors 
and failures were no concern of his. Shi Le replied, "Your fame extends over 
all the four seas, and since your youth you have occupied high positions. 
. . .  How can you claim to have taken no part in the affairs of the world? Indeed 
it is your fault that the empire is defeated and destroyed!,,84 And so he killed 
him. 
In similar fashion, Zhang Hua wrote an essay of warning about consort 
families, but he later served the government of the Empress Jia. In 300 he 
was arrested and sentenced to death by Sima Lun. On the eve of execution 
he sought to justify himself to one of his captors, but he was asked to 
explain why he had not protested earlier, even to death, at the deposition 
of the Heir Apparent Sima Yu. Zhang Hua replied that he had spoken 
against the project in open council. "And when your objections were ig­
nored," came the reply, "why did you not resign your office?" Zhang Hua 
could make no answer. 85 
Even if one considers the nature of their rulers, from the cruelty of the 
Empress Jia to the murderous rivalries of the Eight Princes, the conduct of 
these officials and their colleagues fell far short of the model displayed by 
the proscribed partisans a hundred years earlier, who went voluntarily to 
their deaths for the principles they believed in,86 and they match poorly the 
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personal loyalty that other men had given their chieftains in the years of the 
1bree Kingdoms. The problem at the heart of Western Jin, however, was 
more than the limited responsibility shown by individuals at the court, for 
their attitude represented the culmination of a process of political with­
drawal, a separation between the ruler and the chiefs of his subjects, which 
had been developing since the time of Han and which was displayed very 
clearly when the illusion of unity was restored by Jin. 
In writing this paper, I have largely avoided such terms as 'feudalism' and 
'aristocracy', for such general descriptions, unless carefully defined, carry too 
many implications and allow too much room for misunderstanding. The 
nature of Chinese society and politics in the period between the fall of Han 
and the rise of Sui and Tang has in recent years been the subject of con­
siderable debate and two particular problems have appeared in the course 
of that discussion: there is uncertainty and disagreement about terminology; 
and there is a question whether the four centuries of this period of division 
can be properly treated as a whole. 87 Such a complex matter can be dealt with 
only briefly here, but I suggest that in the time of Wei and Western Jin the 
political and intellectual structure of imperial China was faced with a crisis 
that arose from an economic and social situation was already developing 
during Han.88 
Two separate, contradictory factors were in play. Firstly, from the time 
of Later Han and increasingly during the distutbances which accompanied 
its fall, by a process of commendation well recognized in the history of 
Western feudalism, powerful local families gathered about them increasing 
numbers of tenants and clients who sought the protection of their leadership, 
and who in tum gave support to their power. Secondly, however, because 
the imperial state continued to operate on the philosophical basis of a direct 
relationship between the ruler and each of his subjects, that private system 
of commendation was not extended into a public hierarchy offeudalism. The 
very fact that the emperor claimed ultimate authority over all the land, while 
every subject in theory owed a general duty of service and taxation, 
prevented the development of any system which relied upon individual and 
hereditary contracts of fiefdom. 
From the time of Later Han, the decline of central authority brought a 
fragmentation of the political and economic structure of the empire, while 
the power of great families came from their own resources and organiza­
tion, not from any dispensation of the imperial government. It is true that 
the governments of Han, Wei andJin awarded titles of nobility such as king 
or prince, duke and marquis, but these reflected political relationships and 
favour, and they did not create political power.89 In contrast, the families 
which held real authority in the empire owned no such relationship with 
their ruler as did medieval feudatories in the West: there was no system of 
sub-infeudation, no contract to exchange land for service, no legal 
argument about contending rights and obligations, and no alternative 
authority to whom a subject might appeal. 90 In this respect, the political and 
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88 Besides the chapters on Fonner and Later 
Han economy and society by Patricia Ebrey 
and Nishijima Sadao in CC 1 ,  the work of 
Ch'u Tung-tsu, Han social structure, ed. 
Jack L. Dull (Seattle: University of Washing­
ton Press, 1972) is an important contribution 
to the field. As several reviewers have pointed 
out, however, Ch'u's work gives little indica­
tion of changes and development during 
Han: see, for example, Somers, "Farly Impe­
rial China," p.130, and the review by A.F.P. 
Hulsewe in T'oungPao62 (974): 330-7. By 
contrast, Etienne Balazs, "Nihilistic revolt," 
Ch'en Ch'i-ytin, Hsun yaeh and the mind of 
late Han China, and Donald Holzman, "Les 
sept sages de la foret des bambous et la 
societe de leur temps," T'oungPao44 (956): 
317-346; La vie et la pens&! de Hi Kang 
(223-262 ap.j.c.) (Leiden: EJ. Brill, 1957); 
and Poetry and fXJlitics: The life and works of 
Juan Chi, AD 210-263 (Cambridge: Cam­
bridge University Press, 1976), have studied 
different aspects of the period from the end 
of Han to Wei. 
89 Under Jin, as under Later Han and Wei, 
the fact that a man was enfeoffed as a prince 
or other lesser title gave him no more than 
a pension. His real authority depended 
upon his position in the imperial administra­
tion, whether as minister, military officer or 
area commander. (There was, however, as 
we have observed at p.l44 above, a substan­
tial difference in policy: whereas Han and 
Wei had deliberately excluded princes of 
the imperial clan from any executive post, 
the government of Jin allowed and encour­
aged them to hold such positions.) 
90 In the medieval West, when the Angevin 
King of England was also Duke of Nonnandy , 
a discontented baron could seek support 
from the Pope or from the King of France, 
and the quarrel was rapidly enmeshed in a 
complex web of suzerain relationships; in 
China, there was no way short of treason 
and exile to avoid a direct confrontation. 
Similarly, in early modern times, Eugene of 
Savoy could quit the court of Louis XIV to 
command the Hapsburg annies against 
France; even in the confusions of the Three 
Kingdoms period there is no Chinese paral­
lel to such a successful and accepted transfer 
of allegiance. 
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91 One should note, however, Graffiin's 
conclusion ("Great families: p.74) that "Fa­
mous names of the Chin dynasty were in 
circulation during the Tang, not because 
their bearers had dominated the intervening 
centuries, but because the Sino-foreign hy­
brid aristocracy, developing out of the North­
ern Wei, had to look back to the Chin in 
order to claim Chinese ancestry for an 
upper-class society significantly alien in 
derivation." 
92 In this I follow Ebrey, Aristocratic fami­
lies, p.l 0, who compares the 'nobility', those 
families which gained wealth and prestige 
from association with the imperial throne, 
with the 'aristocracy', or super..elite families 
which had sufficient independent power to 
survive the withdrawal of imperial patron­
age. 
93 As above, and mutatis mutandis, I sug­
gest a parallel with the English gentry or 
French noblesse of early modem Europe. 
One may observe that for the noblesse of the 
ancien regime, and in the traditional con­
ception of the British gentleman, it was 
membership of the class that was important, 
rather than any formality of ranks within it. 
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social status of those leading families may best be compared, not to that 
of the great feudatories of medieval times, but to the English gentry or the 
French noblesse of early modem Europe, and even then it must be observed 
that privileges granted by the throne of China did not compare to those held 
by the noblesse in France, as, for example, exemption from taxation by the 
taille. 
A number of terms have been used to describe these families, whether 
they were 'aristocratic' or 'elite', an 'oligarchy' or a 'nobility'. One difficulty 
in analysis arises from the bias of the official Chinese histories, which 
emphasize the holding of an official position, rank or title as a sign of social 
status, and pay chief attention to those individuals or kinship groups which 
acquire such recognition. Naturally enough, given the records available, 
modem scholarship has concentrated on families such as the Cui � and the 
Xie �, who occupied positions at court and whose lineage may be traced 
through the whole period of division.91 Nevertheless, though these 'super­
elite' clans are of interest in their own right, the attention shown them by 
scholars has tended to distract attention from the broader group which I 
prefer to describe as 'gentry'. At the upper levels of this 'gentry' one may 
identify the 'nobility' who received titles from the ruler, and an 'aristocracy' 
of those few powerful clans which wielded influence at provincial or national 
level. 92 Across the empire as a whole, however, the 'gentry' were a broader 
class, including all those lineage groups, down to village level, which held 
authority through their control and influence over lands, tenants, serfs and 
retainers.93 
At a local level, power was based upon concepts which could be identi­
fied as 'feudal' in the West. As the gentry families enlarged their position, 
however, traditional Chinese theories of political structure could provide no 
means for the national government to negotiate an effective link with this 
important group of leadership in the whole community: it was quite 
inappropriate that the sovereign should enter into a feudal contract, with 
reCiprocal rights and duties. The gentry of China were readily identified 
among the people but, unless they happened to hold some official position, 
they had no formal and particular connection with the emperor and he, for 
his part, had no machinery to interfere with the patron-client relationship 
from which they drew their power. 
As a result, without rights or duties on either side, the imperial regime was 
faced with a Simple withdrawal of interest and support by its most powerful 
subjects. One faction or another might struggle for power at court, and 
dynasty succeed dynasty through intrigue and abdication, but there was no 
obligation upon the gentry to concern themselves with the matter, and no 
reason but self-interest when they chose to do so. 
For the dynasty of Western Jin, in particular, the withdrawal of 
commitment by leading clans and individuals brought a crippling loss of 
confidence and authority, as the weakening of the bonds of loyalty and 
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responsibility limited the moral force of the dynasty, denied the govern­
ment access to a high proportion of the economic resources which it 
theoretically controlled, and rendered the whole imperial state vulnerable 
and unstable. At the same time, however, the changes in society and poli­
tics brought forward a new and exciting debate on the proper relationship 
of the individual with the family, with the state, with the community, and 
with the world at large. 
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